{
  "procedencia": {
    "colector": "influencia",
    "capa": "publico",
    "obtenido_en": "2026-10-21T21:10:13+00:00",
    "fuente": {
      "nombre": "Google — boletín trimestral de operaciones de influencia coordinada (TAG Bulletin); TikTok — informes de operaciones de influencia encubiertas",
      "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/"
    },
    "calificacion": {
      "fiabilidad": "B",
      "credibilidad": 3,
      "corroborado": false,
      "nota": "Una sola empresa informa sobre lo que ella misma dio de baja y no publica la evidencia de sus atribuciones. Fiabilidad B por la regularidad y el detalle del registro; credibilidad 3 porque no hay segunda fuente que lo corrobore."
    },
    "vacios_declarados": [
      "LA ATRIBUCIÓN ES DE LA PLATAFORMA, NO DE LA FUNDACIÓN. Este registro publica que Google dio de baja una red y a qué país la vinculó; no afirma que la red responda a ese Estado.",
      "TODOS LOS ORÍGENES CUENTAN IGUAL: la red vinculada a un país de la región se registra igual que la vinculada a uno de fuera. De las 36 redes que nombran a un país de la región, Google vincula 23 a la propia región, 4 a un país de fuera de ella y no declara origen en 9.",
      "UN CERO NO ES AUSENCIA DE ACTIVIDAD: Google solo informa lo que detecta en sus propios servicios. WhatsApp, Telegram, TikTok y X no publican registros comparables; X dejó de hacerlo.",
      "UNA SOLA EMPRESA, DE ESTADOS UNIDOS. Detecta lo que busca y lo que prioriza. No hay otra fuente abierta que registre redes de este modo para comparar.",
      "SE LEEN LOS BOLETINES DESDE 2022: 18 boletines y 778 redes en total. 0 redes nombran a la región en general —América Latina, el Caribe— sin nombrar un país, y no se asignan a ninguno.",
      "OTRAS 34 REDES PUBLICABAN EN CASTELLANO O PORTUGUÉS SIN NOMBRAR A NINGÚN PAÍS DE LA REGIÓN —de ellas, 33 vinculadas por Google a un país de fuera de la región—. Pudieron dirigirse a la región, pero el texto de Google no permite asignarlas a un Estado: quedan fuera de las fichas por país y se cuentan acá.",
      "TIKTOK ES LA SEGUNDA FUENTE, sobre su propia plataforma: no corrobora a Google red por red, porque cada empresa informa lo que encuentra en sus servicios. Que las dos registren redes sobre el mismo país sí es un dato. Cada caso de TikTok se publica con su texto literal.",
      "EL TEXTO DE GOOGLE ESTÁ EN INGLÉS y se publica literal en el archivo de datos, caso por caso, para que cualquiera pueda leer qué dijo la empresa."
    ],
    "restriccion_de_uso": null,
    "cantidad": 33,
    "atribucion": {
      "obra": "SIWA — Reporte de situación de América Latina y el Caribe",
      "autor": "Fundación Sherman Kent — Oficina de Generación de Inteligencia",
      "sitio": "https://siwa.fundacionkent.org/sitio/index.html",
      "uso": "Acceso libre y gratuito. El aporte de la Fundación —recolección, calificación de fuentes y declaración de vacíos— se publica bajo licencia Creative Commons Atribución 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Se permite reproducir, redistribuir y derivar citando la fuente de este modo: «SIWA, Fundación Sherman Kent». Los datos de base pertenecen a los productores citados en cada indicador y conservan la licencia de su fuente; cuando una fuente impone condiciones adicionales, se declaran en «restriccion_de_uso».",
      "licencia": "CC BY 4.0",
      "licencia_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
      "no_implica": "La cita no implica aval de la Fundación sobre el uso que se haga de estos datos, ni sobre las conclusiones ajenas."
    }
  },
  "registros": [
    {
      "iso": "VEN",
      "pais": "Venezuela",
      "bloque": "Andina",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 7,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 6
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 2,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 40,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Latin America We assess that this network operated primarily from Iran and targeted audiences in Latin America to include Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas and fictitious news accounts that shared Spanish-language content favorable to Iran.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 10,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to influence user perception of Ecuadorian political figures. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post comments relating to a political figure. The number of followers for the network targeting Bolivia was amended after further quality checks on the underlying dataset.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 6,
          "cuentas": 10,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to influence user perception of Ecuadorian political figures. The network was found to create fictitious personas and repost the same content between these accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 250,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Panamanian audiences. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, in an attempt to manipulate Ecuadorian, Colombian and Panamanian elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures and were found to initially focus content on Ecuadorian politics, later switching to focus on Panamanian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 521,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted a Venezuelan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language favorable to the current Venezuelan Government and manipulate discourse on the Esquibo territorial dispute. The operation repurposed content by posting the same videos on multiple accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 83,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela We assess that this network operated from Chile and targeted a Venezuelan audience, including the Venezuelan diaspora in Chile. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language in support of a Venezuelan opposition politician, manipulating Venezuelan elections discourse. On occasion, the network was found to alternate between posting content depicting the beauty of Venezuela and political content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 43 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Venezuela. The campaign was sharing content in English and Spanish that was supportive of Venezuela."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 20 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Japanese that was critical of the Russian and Venezuelan governments."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 28 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Venezuelan government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Russia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Armenian and Spanish that was supportive of Russia and Venezuela and critical of Armenia."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 32 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Colombia. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the United States government and critical of the Venezuelan government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 40 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Venezuela. The campaign was sharing content in English and Spanish that was supportive of the Venezuelan government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2025/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Russia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Arabic and Spanish that was supportive of Russia and Venezuela and critical of Argentina and the US."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2023,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2023/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 10 YouTube channels and 4 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Venezuela. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "URY",
      "pais": "Uruguay",
      "bloque": "Cono Sur",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "TTO",
      "pais": "Trinidad y Tobago",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "SUR",
      "pais": "Surinam",
      "bloque": "Guayanas",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "VCT",
      "pais": "San Vicente y las Granadinas",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "LCA",
      "pais": "Santa Lucía",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "KNA",
      "pais": "San Cristóbal y Nieves",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "PER",
      "pais": "Perú",
      "bloque": "Andina",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 4,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 4
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 340,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Peru We assess that this network operated from Peru and targeted a Peruvian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives relating to the 2026 Peruvian municipal elections. The network primarily used TikTok's commenting feature to further its aims.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Peru",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 6,
          "cuentas": 21,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Peru We assess that this network operated from Argentina and targeted a Peruvian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives relevant to the 2026 Peruvian election. We assess that the network used artificial intelligence to generate personas masquerading as Peruvian citizens.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 23,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Peru We assess that this network operated from Peru and targeted a Peruvian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify claims of electoral fraud, within the context of the 2026 Peruvian presidential election. The network was found to create content that it presented as news.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Peru",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 426,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Peru We assess that this network operated from Peru and targeted a Peruvian audience. The network was found to create inauthentic accounts in order to promote a political party within the context of the 2026 Peruvian general election. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as fan accounts for a political party.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Peru",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 2,
          "cuentas": 9,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting economic relations between China and Peru We assess that this network operated from China and targeted English-and Spanish-speaking Chinese audiences in Peru. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote narratives suggesting positive relationships between China and Peru following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru. The network was found to alternate between posting apolitical and political content in order to drive engagement. The network used technical means to obfuscate its location.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "China",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Peruvian government."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "PRY",
      "pais": "Paraguay",
      "bloque": "Cono Sur",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 25 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Paraguayan government."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "PAN",
      "pais": "Panamá",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 250,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Panamanian audiences. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, in an attempt to manipulate Ecuadorian, Colombian and Panamanian elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures and were found to initially focus content on Ecuadorian politics, later switching to focus on Panamanian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "NIC",
      "pais": "Nicaragua",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "MEX",
      "pais": "México",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 2,
          "cuentas": 45,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador and Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted an Ecuadorian and Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote a political candidate in the 2025 Ecuadorian elections and later to discredit a political party in Mexico. The network was found to create fictitious personas.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 583,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote certain political parties, politicians and public figures while criticizing others, within the context of the 2025 Mexican judicial elections. The network was found to set up a large proportion of its accounts for the sole purpose of posting comments reinforcing its narratives.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 489,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, favorable to certain Mexican politicians. The network was found to pose as well-known news media entities in order to post content furthering its strategic aim.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 107,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political and social discourse in Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish favorable to specific business interests, attempting to manipulate domestic political discourse and shape public discussion of social issues. The accounts within the network initially posted content related to food, gaming, tourism, and sports to build an audience before switching to political discourse.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Mexican government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 3,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 89 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ecuador. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish about Mexican and Ecuadorian politics."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 20 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of the Mexican ruling party."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 28 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Mexican ruling party."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2023,
          "trimestre": 3,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2023/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 327 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Morena party and Senator Ricardo Monreal."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2023,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2023/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 188 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Morena party and Senator Ricardo Monreal."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2023,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2023/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 239 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Morena party and Senator Ricardo Monreal."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "JAM",
      "pais": "Jamaica",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "HND",
      "pais": "Honduras",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Latin America",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Latin America. The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of local and national politicians in Ecuador and Honduras. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "HTI",
      "pais": "Haití",
      "bloque": "Caribe hispano y Haití",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 29,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Haiti We assess that this network operated from Haiti and targeted a Haitian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives portraying Vladimir Putin as a respected and admired leader. The network was found to have used Large Language Models to generate captions for its videos.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Haiti",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals in Cameroon and Haiti",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 33 YouTube channels and 3 AdSense accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals in Cameroon and Haiti. The campaign was sharing content in French that was supportive of China and critical of the West."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "GUY",
      "pais": "Guyana",
      "bloque": "Guayanas",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "GTM",
      "pais": "Guatemala",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 2,
          "cuentas": 266,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Guatemala We assess that this network operated from Guatemala and targeted a Guatemalan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language critical of the Seed Movement Party (Movimiento Semilla) and in support of a rival politician, attempting to manipulate Guatemalan elections discourse. The network was found to utilize numerous fictitious personas with stock or stolen imagery as Profile Pictures.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Guatemala",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "GRD",
      "pais": "Granada",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "SLV",
      "pais": "El Salvador",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Costa Rica",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 37 YouTube accounts and 1 Ads account and blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Costa Rica. The campaign was linked to Noelix Media and was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of Costa Rican and Salvadoran politicians and political parties. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "ECU",
      "pais": "Ecuador",
      "bloque": "Andina",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 2,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 5
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 2
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 40,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Latin America We assess that this network operated primarily from Iran and targeted audiences in Latin America to include Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas and fictitious news accounts that shared Spanish-language content favorable to Iran.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 2,
          "cuentas": 45,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador and Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted an Ecuadorian and Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote a political candidate in the 2025 Ecuadorian elections and later to discredit a political party in Mexico. The network was found to create fictitious personas.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Mexico",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 10,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to influence user perception of Ecuadorian political figures. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post comments relating to a political figure. The number of followers for the network targeting Bolivia was amended after further quality checks on the underlying dataset.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 6,
          "cuentas": 10,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to influence user perception of Ecuadorian political figures. The network was found to create fictitious personas and repost the same content between these accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 201,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote certain presidential candidates while criticizing others within the context of the 2025 Ecuadorian general election. The network was found to set up a small proportion of its accounts as political parody accounts, using humor to further its strategic aims.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 2,
          "cuentas": 585,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify content criticizing certain politicians, while promoting others, within the context of the 2025 Ecuadorian general election. The network was found to repost the same videos at scale, and artificially amplify its reach by using network accounts to like its own content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 1,
          "cuentas": 147,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts, manipulating Ecuadorian political discourse by amplifying negative content about certain politicians and positive content about others ahead of the 2025 Ecuadorian general election. We assess that the network was managed by a digital marketing agency.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 6,
          "cuentas": 28,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish critical of a specific politician and their associates. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post content at scale across their accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 250,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Panamanian audiences. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, in an attempt to manipulate Ecuadorian, Colombian and Panamanian elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures and were found to initially focus content on Ecuadorian politics, later switching to focus on Panamanian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 26,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Spanish language, which were critical of a leftist political movement in Ecuador and of Colombia’s current government. The network was found to initially focus its content on Ecuadorian politics before later shifting its focus to Colombian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 3,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 89 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ecuador. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish about Mexican and Ecuadorian politics."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Latin America",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Latin America. The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of local and national politicians in Ecuador and Honduras. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "DOM",
      "pais": "República Dominicana",
      "bloque": "Caribe hispano y Haití",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 1,
          "cuentas": 22,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in the Dominican Republic We assess that this network operated from the Dominican Republic and targeted a Dominican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to one politician. The accounts within the network were found to use stock or stolen profile images in order to make their profiles appear more authentic.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "the Dominican Republic",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "DMA",
      "pais": "Dominica",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "CUB",
      "pais": "Cuba",
      "bloque": "Caribe hispano y Haití",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Canada",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 45 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Canada. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of Cuba and critical of the United States."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "CRI",
      "pais": "Costa Rica",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Costa Rica",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 37 YouTube accounts and 1 Ads account and blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Costa Rica. The campaign was linked to Noelix Media and was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of Costa Rican and Salvadoran politicians and political parties. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "COL",
      "pais": "Colombia",
      "bloque": "Andina",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 3,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 3
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 6,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 6
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 45,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Colombia We assess that this network operated from Colombia and targeted a Colombian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives relating to Colombian politics. The network was found to create fictitious personas by reusing images that were publicly posted on social media platforms.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 64,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Colombia We assess that this network operated from Colombia and targeted a Colombian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives relating to the 2026 Colombian presidential election. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 40,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Latin America We assess that this network operated primarily from Iran and targeted audiences in Latin America to include Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas and fictitious news accounts that shared Spanish-language content favorable to Iran.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 56,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Colombia We assess that this network operated from Colombia and targeted a Colombian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify support for certain candidates, while undermining support for others, within the context of the Colombian elections. The network was found to create accounts that it presented as news accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 91,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Colombia We assess that this network operated from Colombia and targeted a Colombian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote a governor of Colombia while criticizing several other Colombian politicians. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 3,
          "cuentas": 16,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Colombia We assess that this network operated from Colombia and targeted a Colombian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to shift public sentiment in Colombia against partnership with Ukraine as it pertains to the ongoing conflict with Russia. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 5,
          "cuentas": 250,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Panamanian audiences. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, in an attempt to manipulate Ecuadorian, Colombian and Panamanian elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures and were found to initially focus content on Ecuadorian politics, later switching to focus on Panamanian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 26,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Spanish language, which were critical of a leftist political movement in Ecuador and of Colombia’s current government. The network was found to initially focus its content on Ecuadorian politics before later shifting its focus to Colombian politics.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Ecuador",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 13 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of a candidate in Colombia’s 2026 presidential election."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 110 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Chile. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of a candidate in Colombia’s 2026 presidential election and supportive of another candidate."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 32 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Colombia. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the United States government and critical of the Venezuelan government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals from Colombia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 19 YouTube channels, 2 AdSense accounts, and 6 Blogger blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals from Colombia. The campaign was sharing sensational content in Spanish that was about a variety of topics including U.S. immigration policy and the U.S. midterm elections. We believe this operation was financially motivated."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "CHL",
      "pais": "Chile",
      "bloque": "Cono Sur",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 2,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 11,
          "cuentas": 13,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Chile We assess that this network operated from Chile and targeted a Chilean audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote a certain politician while criticizing others, within the context of the 2025 Chilean general elections. The network was found to create accounts which it presented as news accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 49,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Chile We assess that this network operated from Chile and targeted a Chilean audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to influence political viewpoints ahead of the 2025 Chilean general election. The network was found to delete its content regularly, likely in an attempt to evade detection.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 4,
          "cuentas": 83,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela We assess that this network operated from Chile and targeted a Venezuelan audience, including the Venezuelan diaspora in Chile. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language in support of a Venezuelan opposition politician, manipulating Venezuelan elections discourse. On occasion, the network was found to alternate between posting content depicting the beauty of Venezuela and political content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Chile",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 110 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Chile. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was critical of a candidate in Colombia’s 2026 presidential election and supportive of another candidate."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "trimestre": 3,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2025/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 63 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of a Chilean political party."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "BRA",
      "pais": "Brasil",
      "bloque": "Cono Sur",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 4,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 4
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 37,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify political narratives ahead of the 2026 Brazilian presidential election. The network frequently shared AI-generated content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 10,
          "cuentas": 12,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Portuguese language critical of the current administration. We assess that the network posted content on non-political topics in order to gain engagement before pivoting to political content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "mes": 9,
          "cuentas": 15,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to a specific politician and critical of the current administration. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 47 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was critical of Brazil."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 37 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was supportive of the Brazilian government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was supportive of the Brazilian government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q1-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 166 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was supportive of a Brazilian political party."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 76 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. The campaign was sharing content in Brazilian Portuguese that was supportive of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals from Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 13 YouTube channels, 1 AdSense account, and 5 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals from Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was about a variety of topics including U.S. elections, Brazilian elections, the war in Ukraine, and COVID-19. We believe this operation was financially motivated."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Brazil",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 57 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was supportive of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "BOL",
      "pais": "Bolivia",
      "bloque": "Andina",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 3
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 1
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 40,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Latin America We assess that this network operated primarily from Iran and targeted audiences in Latin America to include Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas and fictitious news accounts that shared Spanish-language content favorable to Iran.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 9,
          "cuentas": 44,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Bolivia We assess that this network operated from Bolivia and targeted a Bolivian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to certain politicians within the context of the 2025 Bolivian general election. The network was found to post a large volume of duplicate content in an attempt to artificially amplify its narratives.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Bolivia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 397,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Bolivia We assess that this network operated from Bolivia and targeted a Bolivian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify content aligned with a candidate for the upcoming 2025 Bolivian general election, while criticizing another candidate. The network was found to post a large volume of duplicate content across its accounts.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Bolivia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 8,
          "cuentas": 10,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to influence user perception of Ecuadorian political figures. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post comments relating to a political figure. The number of followers for the network targeting Bolivia was amended after further quality checks on the underlying dataset.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Venezuela",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "BLZ",
      "pais": "Belice",
      "bloque": "México y Centroamérica",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "BRB",
      "pais": "Barbados",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "BHS",
      "pais": "Bahamas",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    },
    {
      "iso": "ARG",
      "pais": "Argentina",
      "bloque": "Cono Sur",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 4,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 2
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 3
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 1,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 2,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 1
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 2
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 7,
          "cuentas": 40,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Latin America We assess that this network operated primarily from Iran and targeted audiences in Latin America to include Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Ecuador. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas and fictitious news accounts that shared Spanish-language content favorable to Iran.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "mes": 6,
          "cuentas": 21,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Peru We assess that this network operated from Argentina and targeted a Peruvian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives relevant to the 2026 Peruvian election. We assess that the network used artificial intelligence to generate personas masquerading as Peruvian citizens.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "mes": 10,
          "cuentas": 117,
          "texto_de_tiktok": "Accounts targeting political discourse in Argentina We assess that this network operated from Argentina and targeted an Argentine audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to a political party. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post its content.",
          "opero_desde_segun_tiktok": "Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región"
        }
      ],
      "casos": [
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 13 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of a candidate in Colombia’s 2026 presidential election."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Argentinian government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2026,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/security/influence-operations-bulletin-q2-2026/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": null,
          "clase_de_vinculo": "sin declarar",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 28 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Argentine government, a Spanish political party, and the United States government and critical of the Spanish government."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2025,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2025/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "Russia",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "fuera de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Arabic and Spanish that was supportive of Russia and Venezuela and critical of Argentina and the US."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 2,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals in Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals in Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was critical of opposition political parties in Portugal."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2024,
          "trimestre": 1,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2024/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals in Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals in Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Portuguese that was critical of opposition political parties in Portugal."
        },
        {
          "anio": 2022,
          "trimestre": 4,
          "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
          "vinculada_segun_google": "individuals from Argentina",
          "clase_de_vinculo": "de la región",
          "texto_de_google": "We terminated 13 YouTube channels, 1 AdSense account, and 5 Ads accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to individuals from Argentina. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was about a variety of topics including U.S. elections, Brazilian elections, the war in Ukraine, and COVID-19. We believe this operation was financially motivated."
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "iso": "ATG",
      "pais": "Antigua y Barbuda",
      "bloque": "Caribe oriental",
      "indicadores": {
        "redes_influencia": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_extrarregional": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "3.º trimestre de 2025 al 2.º de 2026",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2022,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2023,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        },
        "redes_influencia_tiktok": {
          "valor": 0,
          "anio": 2026,
          "periodo": "últimos doce meses",
          "anio_anterior": null,
          "valor_anterior": null,
          "serie": [
            {
              "anio": 2024,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2025,
              "valor": 0
            },
            {
              "anio": 2026,
              "valor": 0
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "casos_tiktok": [],
      "casos": []
    }
  ],
  "indicadores": [
    {
      "clave": "redes_influencia",
      "rotulo": "Redes de influencia dadas de baja por Google que mencionan al país",
      "eje": "Gobernanza",
      "unidad": "redes en los últimos cuatro trimestres",
      "unidad_singular": "red",
      "mas_es_peor": true,
      "sin_direccion": true,
      "origen": "Google — boletín trimestral de operaciones de influencia coordinada",
      "cautela": "SEGÚN GOOGLE, no según la Fundación. Cuenta las redes que Google informa haber dado de baja en YouTube, Blogger, sus anuncios o sus noticias y cuyo texto nombra al país —como origen, como tema o como destinatario—. Un número alto puede reflejar más actividad o más atención de Google; un CERO no prueba ausencia de actividad. No mira WhatsApp, Telegram, TikTok ni X.",
      "hasta_anio": 2026,
      "rezago_anios": 0,
      "seccion": "entorno-informativo",
      "seccion_rotulo": "Entorno informativo"
    },
    {
      "clave": "redes_influencia_extrarregional",
      "rotulo": "De ellas, vinculadas por Google a un país de fuera de la región",
      "eje": "Gobernanza",
      "unidad": "redes en los últimos cuatro trimestres",
      "unidad_singular": "red",
      "mas_es_peor": true,
      "sin_direccion": true,
      "origen": "Google — boletín trimestral de operaciones de influencia coordinada",
      "cautela": "LA ATRIBUCIÓN ES DE GOOGLE y la Fundación no puede verificarla: la empresa no publica la evidencia técnica. Cuenta las redes que Google vincula, con sus palabras, a un país de fuera de América Latina y el Caribe —Rusia, China, Irán, Canadá o cualquier otro—, sin distinguir cuál. Cada caso se publica con el texto literal de Google en el archivo de datos.",
      "hasta_anio": 2026,
      "rezago_anios": 0,
      "seccion": "entorno-informativo",
      "seccion_rotulo": "Entorno informativo"
    },
    {
      "clave": "redes_influencia_tiktok",
      "rotulo": "Redes de influencia desarticuladas por TikTok que mencionan al país",
      "eje": "Gobernanza",
      "unidad": "redes en los últimos doce meses",
      "unidad_singular": "red",
      "mas_es_peor": true,
      "sin_direccion": true,
      "origen": "TikTok — informes mensuales de operaciones de influencia encubiertas",
      "cautela": "SEGÚN TIKTOK, no según la Fundación. Segunda fuente de las redes de influencia, sobre otra plataforma: cuenta las redes que TikTok informa haber desarticulado y cuyo texto nombra al país. TikTok dice desde qué país operó cada red; la Fundación no puede verificarlo. Un cero no prueba ausencia de actividad.",
      "hasta_anio": 2026,
      "rezago_anios": 0,
      "seccion": "entorno-informativo",
      "seccion_rotulo": "Entorno informativo"
    }
  ],
  "cobertura": {
    "redes_influencia": 33,
    "redes_influencia_extrarregional": 33,
    "redes_influencia_tiktok": 33
  },
  "resumen": {
    "boletines": [
      {
        "anio": 2022,
        "trimestre": 1,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2022/",
        "redes": 28
      },
      {
        "anio": 2022,
        "trimestre": 2,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2022/",
        "redes": 17
      },
      {
        "anio": 2022,
        "trimestre": 3,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2022/",
        "redes": 20
      },
      {
        "anio": 2022,
        "trimestre": 4,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2022/",
        "redes": 25
      },
      {
        "anio": 2023,
        "trimestre": 1,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2023/",
        "redes": 21
      },
      {
        "anio": 2023,
        "trimestre": 2,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2023/",
        "redes": 30
      },
      {
        "anio": 2023,
        "trimestre": 3,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q3-2023/",
        "redes": 23
      },
      {
        "anio": 2023,
        "trimestre": 4,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q4-2023/",
        "redes": 31
      },
      {
        "anio": 2024,
        "trimestre": 1,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q1-2024/",
        "redes": 30
      },
      {
        "anio": 2024,
        "trimestre": 2,
        "url": "https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2024/",
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}